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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TENTH AMENDMENT:
THE SUPREME COURT STRIKES DOWN THE BRADY ACT
AS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL INFRINGEMENT OF TENTH
AMENDMENT STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997)
I. FACTS
The Gun Control Act of 1968 set forth federal regulatory guide-
lines governing the ownership and sale of firearms.' In 1993, Congress
amended that Act in order to establish a national instant background
check within five years. 2 In the interim, Congress sought state assistance
in the implementation of the Act through certain statutory provisions. 3
Under the provisions, a city's Chief Law Enforcement Officer (CLEO)
was required to obtain a copy of the Brady Form from the area gun
dealers. 4 The Brady Form included the buyer's name, address, date of
birth, a description of the identification offered, and a sworn statement
that the buyer was not a member of any class forbidden by law to own a
handgun. 5 From that information, the CLEO made a reasonable effort
to ascertain within five days if the transaction would violate the law. 6 If
the CLEO determined that the sale would be unlawful and chose to
inform the dealer, then upon request, the CLEO would have to furnish
the purchaser with a written statement of the reasons for that
determination. 7 If the CLEO determined that the sale would not be
unlawful, the CLEO had to destroy all records of the inquiry within
twenty days. 8
1. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-28 (1994 & West
Supp. 1998)); see Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2368 (1997). Under the Act, it is illegal for a
firearms dealer to sell a handgun to anyone under 21, or anyone not a resident of the dealer's state, or
anyone otherwise prohibited from purchasing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)-(g). In addition, the Act
identifies felons, fugitives, illicit drug users, the mentally ill, illegal aliens, and dishonorably discharged
veterans as among the class of citizens forbidden to possess or purchase a firearm. Id. The Act also
enacted several sections of Title 26, though not relevant to this article. Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 101, 82
Stat. 1214-16 (codified in various sections of 26 U.S.C.).
2. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994)); see also Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 103(b) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
922 note) anended by Pub. L. No. 103-322, 103 Stat. 2074 (1994) (requiring the Attorney General to
establish a permanent background check system within 60 months of the Act's date of enactment).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s).
4. Id. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(1ll). The "CLEO" is defined as the chief of police, sheriff, or equivalent
officer of the transferee's city or county of residence. Id. § 922(s)(8).
5. Id. § 922(s)(l)(A)(i)(1).
6. Id. § 922(s)(2). The "reasonable effort" requirement included research in whatever state and
local record-keeping systems were available, as well as a national system to be designated by the
Attorney General. Id.
7. Id. § 922(s)(6)(C).
8. Id. § 922(s)(6)(B)(i).
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In separate actions, the petitioners, Jay Printz and Richard Mack, the
sheriffs and CLEOs of Ravalli County, Montana, and Graham County,
Arizona, respectively, challenged the constitutionality of the interim pro-
visions under the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. 9 The federal district
courts held that the background check provision exceeded the congres-
sional power conferred by the Commerce Clause and consequently vio-
lated the Tenth Amendment.10 Moreover, both courts found that since
the background check was severable from the rest of the Act, the re-
maining provisions became optional and as a result, they were not
unconstitutional. 11
However, after consolidating the two cases for appeal, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed.12 The Court of Appeals held that be-
cause the CLEOs did not engage in the sovereign processes of enacting
legislation or regulation, the Brady Act was not an unconstitutional man-
date to the states, or an unconstitutional infringement of Tenth Amend-
ment state sovereignty.1 3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order
to determine whether Congress can direct state law enforcement officers
to administer a federal regulatory program. 14 In a five-to-four decision,
the Court held that such an empowerment of Congressional empower-
ment would destroy the fundamental principles of constitutionally
established dual sovereignty set forth in the Tenth Amendment.15
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution arose from a need for the economic
and social stabilization not realized under the Articles of the
9. See Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1374 (D. Ariz. 1994); Printz v. United States,
854 F. Supp. 1503, 1506-07 (D. Mont. 1994). Both Printz and Mack also claimed that in subjecting the
CLEOs to criminal penalties without a clear definition of what constituted "reasonable efforts," the
Act was unconstitutionally vague and violates the Fifth Amendment. Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1381;
Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1509-10. However, only the court in Mack found that the criminal sanctions of
the Act would apply to CLEOs, thereby implicating Due Process prohibitions of vagueness. Mack, 856
F. Supp. at 1382; see also Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1510 (finding that the criminal sanctions contained in
the Act did not apply to the CLEOs). Mack also claimed that the provisions constituted involuntary
servitude in violation of the 13th Amendment. Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1382. The court dismissed that
claim on the grounds that Mack could simply quit his job and be free of the duties imposed by the Act.
Id.
10. Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1381; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1519-20.
I1. Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1383; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1519.
12. Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th. Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit held that the pro-
visions violated neither the Tenth Amendment nor the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 1034. In addi-
tion, the court dismissed the Fifth Amendment challenge as lacking ripeness and also dismissed the
appeal of the district court's rulings on the severability of the provisions as moot. Id.
13. Id. at 1031.
14. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2368 (1997).
15. Id. at 2384. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Kennedy,




Confederation. 16 The principle problem facing the original drafters was
how to increase national power in response to the crisis, while also
preserving state sovereignty. 17 The result of those conflicting interests
was a doctrine of dual sovereignty in which the powers not delegated to
the federal government were reserved to the states through the Tenth
Amendment. 18
Although the Tenth Amendment has been interpreted in the past as
having created a system of absolute, coequal sovereigns between the
states and the federal government, that is not the law today. 19 The
expansion of federal power under the taxing and spending powers, the
commerce power, and the Fourteenth Amendment has gone largely
unchecked by the Tenth Amendment. 20 However, the federal comman-
deering of state governments is a fairly recent phenomenon. 2 1 Nowhere
is this more true than with the issue at hand; the federal commandeering
of state executive officials. 22 Unfortunately, an examination of Supreme
Court case law reveals that the Court has struggled to clarify what role
the Tenth Amendment guarantees for the states within our federal
16. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAl. LAW 93 (12th ed. 1991). The Articles of the Con-
federation limited the powers of the central government to expressly delegated powers. Id. at 77. See
ARTICLES OF THE CONFEDERATION ART. 2. Most notably, the central government lacked the power to
regulate trade. See NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES
MADISON AT XVIII (A. Koch ed. 1966). This lack of power was generally perceived as the root of the
country's economic travails and was the focus of the Constitutional Convention. GUNTHER, supra, at
93.
17. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 6, 17 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 14 (James Madison).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
19. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761 (1982) (citing Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 107
(1861)).
20. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 209 (1987) (noting that the 10th Amendment's limita-
tions on the congressional regulation of state affairs did not limit the range of conditions that could be
placed upon federal grants); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. I 11, 125 (1942) (holding that the aggregate
effects of personal farm excesses substantially affected interstate commerce and were subject to the
commerce power). But see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470-73 (1991) (upholding a state
mandatory retirement age in conflict with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and
noting that even though Congress may impose its will upon the states when exercising an enumerated
power, the 10th Amendment requires that Congress do so expressly).
21. See Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 840-41 (9th Cir. 1975). In the 1970s, the EPA promulgated
regulations requiring the states to prescribe auto emissions testing and other programs to reduce
pollution or face the possibility of sanctions. See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604,
84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Both the Fourth and the Ninth
Circuits found that the Amendments were sufficiently ambiguous to permit the courts to avoid deciding
the constitutional ramifications of the amendments simply by holding that the amendments did not
authorize sanctions against states for non-compliance. See Brown, 521 F.2d at 838-42; Maryland v.
EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 226 (4th Cir. 1975). Once certiorari was granted to review the constitutional
validity of the regulations, the government chose not to defend the regulations, leading the Court to
vacate the opinions below and remand for considerations of mootness. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99,
103-04 (1977).
22. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (holding that the Federal Govern-
ment may not commandeer the legislative processes of the states, but not directly addressing whether
federal power could commandeer state executives).
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system. 23 Consequently, the nature of the protections afforded to state
executive officials to be free from the command of the federal govern-
ment remains uncertain. 24
Perhaps for the first time, in Kentucky v. Dennison,25 the Supreme
Court attempted to define the sovereign position of state executive
officials with respect to the federal government. 26 In Dennison, Willis
Lago, an Ohio man, was charged in Kentucky with assisting in the escape
of a slave. 27 The Governor of Ohio refused to grant the State of Ken-
tucky's ensuing extradition request. 28 As a result, the State of Kentucky
brought an action directly to the Supreme Court seeking a mandamus to
compel Lago's extradition. 29 The Court held that the Extradition Clause
did not grant Congress the power to compel a state executive to extradite
fugitives found within that state's territory. 30 Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Taney first determined that the Extradition Clause created a
right for the executive authority in every state to seek the extradition of
any fugitive from any state in which the fugitive could be found.3 1 The
Chief Justice then turned to the language of the Extradition Act of 1793
and determined that the language "shall be the duty," created a moral,
rather than a mandatory obligation on the states' executives to deliver a
fugitive upon request. 32
The Court revisited Dennison in Puerto Rico v. Branstad.33 In
Branstad, the Governor of Puerto Rico requested that the Governor of
Iowa extradite a murder suspect. 34 The Governor of Iowa refused to
execute the extradition, and Puerto Rico subsequently filed a complaint
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa,
seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor of Iowa to comply
23. Conipare New York, 505 U.S. at 149 (stating that the 10th Amendment prohibits Congress
from compelling the states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program), and Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (holding that the protection of state
sovereignty should be accomplished through the procedural protection of a representative
government, though not the judiciary).
24. See New York, 505 U.S. at 160 (refusing to reconsider the validity of Garcia and its allocation
of state protections as procedural, rather than substantive).
25. 24 How. 66 (186 1).
26. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 107 (1861) (holding that the states have reserved rights
which prevent the federal government from controlling the internal functions of states).
27. Id. at 67.
28. Id. at 69-70.
29. Id. at 71.
30. Id. at 107.
31. Id. at 103.
32. Id. at 107. The Act stated that the executive authority of a State or Territory to which a per-
son flees shall cause the fugitive to be arrested and shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to the agent
of that state. Extradition Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 302 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1994)).
33. 483 U.S. 219, 222 (1987).
34. Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 222 (1987).
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with the request. 3 5 The district court dismissed the complaint, holding
that Dennison barred the federal courts from compelling a state to
comply with the Extradition Act.
36
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court found that the
Extradition Clause spoke in unmistakably mandatory terms and that any
person who sustains a personal injury from the failure of a state to
uphold the Clause's requirements may have a mandamus to compel the
performance of those duties.3 7 As a result, the Court held that when
duties are imposed upon the states by the Constitution, there is no need
to weigh the performance of the federal obligation upon state executives
against the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. 38
In addition to the obligation imposed by the Constitution on state
executives through the Extradition Clause, in Testa v. Katt,39 the Court
held that the Supremacy Clause affirmatively required the state judiciary
to enforce any claim arising under a valid federal law. 40 The point of
contention in Testa was the Emergency Price Control Act, which allowed
buyers to sue sellers for selling goods above a prescribed ceiling price
for the merchandise. 4 1 The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed a
lower court decision granting relief on the grounds that the Act was a
penal statute in the international sense and could not be maintained in
the state courts of Rhode Island. 42 Justice Black, writing for the majority,
determined that it made no difference how one classified the Act, be-
cause the obligation of the states to enforce federal law is not lessened by
legal remedy or form.43 Thus, Testa made it clear that state courts of ade-
quate jurisdiction cannot refuse to entertain actions brought before them
under federal law because the policy of a federal act is the prevailing
policy in every state.44
While Branstad and Testa established that the federal government
could require a state to perform any duty imposed directly by the
Constitution, those cases did not address the question of whether Con-
gress could commandeer state legislatures or executives through an
enumerated power. 45 However, that question was addressed in National
35. Id. at 222-23.
36. Id. at 223.
37. Id. at 227 (citing Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531, 541 (1876)).
38. Id. at 228 (emphasis added).
39. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
40. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947).
41. Id. at 387; see 50 U.S.C. § 925 (1994).
42. Testa, 330 U.S. at 388.
43. Id. at 391.
44. Id. at 393.
45. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 228 (1986); Testa, 330 U.S. at 389.
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League of Cities v. Usery,4 6 where for the first time in forty years, the
Court acknowledged the preceding decade's demands of state autonomy
as a limit to congressional control by striking down a federal regulation
based on the commerce power.4 7
At issue in National League of Cities were the 1974 amendments to
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which extended the Act's mini-
mum wage and maximum hour provisions to public employees. 48 In
declaring the amendments unconstitutional, the Court found that the
Tenth Amendment is an express limitation within our federal system on
the authority of Congress to regulate states as states through the com-
merce power.4 9 Moreover, the authority to prescribe wages to be paid by
a state rested in the state's capacity as a sovereign government. 50 Conse-
quently, since the 1974 amendments operated to directly displace a
state's freedom to structure integral operations in the areas of traditional
governmental functions, they exceeded constitutional power by infring-
ing upon state sovereignty. 51
However, five years later, the Court rejected a similar Tenth Amend-
ment challenge to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977.52 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,53 the
Court dismissed the idea that National League of Cities compelled a find-
ing that interference with traditional governmental functions alone
contravened the Tenth Amendment. 54 The Court concluded that in
46. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
47. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 496 U.S. 528 (1985); see also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7
(1975) (acknowledging that the 10th Amendment declares that Congress may not impair a state's
ability to function within the federal system); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 202-03 (1968) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting) (insisting that the 1966 amendments to the FLSA making all hospital employees,
public and private, subject to minimum wage and overtime requirements created such an interference
with the operations of a state government as to be inconsistent with the Constitution).
48. 426 U.S. at 836. The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted in order to end labor conditions
detrimental to the health and welfare of workers. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 1, 88 Stat. 55 (1938) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1994)). It required employers to pay employees a minimum hourly
wage and one and a half times that hourly wage for time worked over 40 hours in one week. 29
U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)(3) (1994). The 1974 amendment redefined "employer" to include public
agencies, and deleted the previous exclusions for the United States, states, and the political
subdivisions of states. 29 U.S.C. § 203.
49. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854-55.
50. Id. at 852.
51. Id.
52. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 293 (1981). The pur-
pose of the challenged Act was to protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of sur-
face coal mining operations. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87,
91 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994)).
53. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
54. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). Relying
on National League of Cities, the district court held that §§ 515 (d) & (e) violated the 10th Amendment
because those sections interfered with traditional governmental functions of regulating land use. Id. at
285. Those'provisions provided that operations on ground slopes in excess of twenty degrees, or steep
548
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order to fall within the National League of Cities paradigm, challenged
legislation must satisfy three requirements. 55 First, the legislation must
regulate "states as states." 56 Second, it must address indisputable attri-
butes of state sovereignty. 57 Finally, compliance with the law must
impair a state's ability to "structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions." 58
The Court held that the Surface Mining Act failed to meet the first
National League of Cities requirement because it governed only private
mine operators, and did not compel the state itself to participate in the
regulatory program. 59 The Court characterized the Act as an example of
cooperative federalism in which states are allowed, within certain
federally prescribed limits, to administer their own regulatory programs
in a field otherwise subject to complete preemption by federal law.60 In
a similar case, FERC v. Mississippi, 6 1 the Court distinguished the
challenge to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act. of 1978 (PURPA)
from National League of Cities.62
As opposed to the FLSA, a law generally applicable to both private
and public entities, PURPA sought to use only state agencies to promote
federal aims. 63 The Court held that PURPA's more troublesome require-
ment that states implement federal rules was only a requirement that the
states adjudicate claims arising under the statute, an activity customarily
engaged in by state utility commissions. 64 As such, the Court reasoned
that this guideline was nothing more than a requirement that state adjudi-
catory bodies apply federal law where appropriately directed by the
slopes, had to: (i) return the site to its original contour; (ii) refrain from dumping spoil material onto
the downslope below the mining cut; and (iii) refrain from disturbing land above the highwall unless
otherwise permitted. § 515(d), 91 Stat. 494 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d) (1994)). A steep slope
operator could obtain a variance from the original contour requirement by showing that the post
reclamation use is of a greater economic or public use than otherwise possible. § 515(e), 91 Stat. 494
(codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1265 (e)(3)(A)(1994)).
55. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287.
56. Id. at 287-88.
57. Id. at 288.
58. Id. (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976)).
59. Id. Under the regulation, a state could assume permanent regulatory authority over surface
mining operations on state land, as long as the state program met federal requirements and was
approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 503, 91 Stat. 470 (codified at 30 U.S.C.
§ 1253 (1994)). However, the Secretary would assume responsibility for the mining operations of
states which failed to submit a satisfactory program. § 504, 91 Stat. 471 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1254
(1994)).
60. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289-91.
61. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
62. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758-59 (1982).
63. Id. at 759. PURPA was enacted to combat the energy crisis occurring during the seventies.
Id. at 745. In order to encourage the development of cogenerators and small power facilities, Section
210 directed the FERC to promulgate the necessary rules and required state authorities to implement
the rules by, at a minimum, resolving disputes case by case. Id. at 75f. Titles I and III of the Act
directed the states to consider the implementation of federal rate designs and regulatory standards. Id.
at 746.
64. Id. at 759-60.
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Constitution. 65 In addition, PURPA's command that states consider fed-
eral rules was upheld in accordance with Hodel, as simply a condition for
continued state participation in an otherwise federally preempted field.66
As the Court noted, if a state did not want to participate, it did not have
to, thus nothing in PURPA directly compelled a state to enact a federal
program. 67 However, nine years later however the Court would change
its posture with respect to Tenth Amendment challenges to congressional
acts. 68
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth.,69 the Transit
Authority canceled overtime payments following the decision in
National League of Cities, and Garcia sued. 70 Justice Blackmun, writing
for the majority, surmised that judicial attempts to define a governmental
function as "traditional" would lead to inconsistent results, and subse-
quently overruled National League of Cities as "unsound in principle
and unworkable in practice."7 1 For Justice Blackmun, the states' equal
representation in the Senate was the constitutional recognition of state
sovereignty. Thus, restraints on federal power were inherent in the pro-
cedural processes of the national government, rather than in judicially
created limitations prompted by the Tenth Amendment. 72 As a result,
the Court held that the FLSA wage and overtime requirements did not
infringe on state sovereignty and did not violate the Constitution.73
Nonetheless, the Tenth Amendment as a protector of states' rights
arose again only seven years after its fall in Garcia.74 In New York v.
United States,75 the Court addressed the constitutionality of three pro-
visions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985.76 The provisions were to provide "incentives" for states to com-
ply with the statutory obligation to provide disposal for waste generated
65. Id.; see also Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (upholding the Emergency Price Control
Act's grant of jurisdiction to state courts over claims arising under the Act). In Testa, the Court relied
on the Supremacy Clause in determining that federal policy is the prevailing policy for the state courts.
Id. at 393. See also U.S. (QNST. Art. VI, § 2 (stating that the laws of the United States "shall be the
supreme law of the Land; and the Judges of every State shall be bound thereby").
66. FERC, 456 U.S. at 764.
67. Id. at 765.
68. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (holding that state
sovereignty is provided by constitutional procedural protections).
69. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
70. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 534 (1985).
71. Id. at 546-47.
72. Id. at 552.
73. Id. at 555-56.
74. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that a regulation based on the
commerce power violates the 10th Amendment).
75. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
76. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
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within the state. 77 Only one of the three provisions, the "take title"
provision, was held to be unconstitutional. 78
Under the "take title" provision, states had a choice either to take
ownership of the waste, or to regulate according to the instructions of
Congress. 79 For the Court, offering states a choice between two constitu-
tionally impermissive alternatives was no choice at all.80 Therefore, the
Court held that the federal government may not compel the states to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program.81 While the holding in
New York outlawed the federal commandeering of state legislative
processes, it did not speak directly in terms of the federal government's
ability to utilize state executive officials to implement federal policy. 82
Against this legal backdrop, Congress passed the Brady Act in 1992 in
response to an epidemic of handgun violence. 83
III. ANALYSIS
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, concluded that because the
Constitution itself did not directly answer the question of whether a
federal regulation can require participation by state law enforcement
officials, the answer had to be within historical constitutional practice, the
structure of the Constitution, and the prior jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court.
8 4
77. Id. at 152. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act was a response to an impending
shortage of waste storage sites. Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1980) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 202lb-j (1994)). It provided for waste disposal by allowing states to enter into compacts,
which ultimately could exclude waste from any non-member state. 94 Stat. at 3348. The 1985
amendments resulted from a lack of participation in forming these compacts. See New York, 505 U.S.
at 151. At that time, 31 states were unsited, or non-members, in a compact. Id. Faced with the
prospect that these states could be without a disposal outlet, the amendments were a compromise such
that the sited states agreed to extend their acceptance of waste from unsited states for seven years, in
exchange for an agreement that the unsited states would end any reliance on sited states by 1992. Id.
78. New York, 505 U.S. at 177. The first provision was a monetary incentive which allowed sited
states to exact a surcharge for waste accepted from unsited states, with a quarter of the surcharge to
be transferred to an escrow account to be held by the Secretary of Energy. Id. at 152. This money
would be paid out to states who met the deadlines for providing for waste disposal. Id. at 153. This
provision was upheld as no more than a federal tax on interstate commerce and an exercise of the
Spending Clause. Id. at 185. The second provision was an access incentive which allowed sited states
to exact excess surcharges from those states failing to meet the planning deadlines for waste disposal,
with the possibility of denying access altogether. Id. at 153. This was held to be a choice for the state
to regulate according to federal standards, or have state law be preempted by federal regulation. Id.
at 173.
79. Id. at 176.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 177.
82. Id. at 161.
83. H.R. REP. No. 103-344, at 8 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1985.
84. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2370 (1995).
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A. HISTORICAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
The Court began its examination of historical practice on the
premise that early congressional enactments "provide contemporaneous
and weighty evidence of the Constitution's meaning." 85 The Court
dismissed the government's argument that statutes of the first congresses,
placing requirements on state courts to perform certain executive and
adjudicative functions, were indicative of Congresses' ability to press the
state executive into federal service. 86 The government had relied on
early naturalization statutes, as well as other statutes requiring state courts
to apply federal prescriptions within the court's judiciary role. 87 For the
Court, there were no indications that the requirements under the
naturalization statutes were applied to any states other than those that
authorized the proceedings by their own accord. 88
In addition, the Supremacy Clause makes it clear that state courts
are constitutionally bound by federal law in matters falling within the
judicial power. 89 The Court also noted that the only early statute that it
considered which required action by a state executive was a direct
implementation of the Extradition Clause itself.90 Thus, the early statutes
did not evidence any historical understanding that Congress could
command state executives into federal service.9 1
The Government's second premise for a historical foundation was
The Federalist.92 The Government pointed to statements by Alexander
Hamilton indicating that the collection of federal revenue would be
made by state appointees, and that the national government could
85. Id. (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986)).
86. Id. at 2370-71.
87. Id.; see also Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (conferring authority upon state
courts to enforce naturalization laws); Act of June 18, 1798, ch- 54, § 2, 1 Stat. 567 (requiring state
courts to transmit abstracts of citizenship applications); Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 2, 2 Stat. 154-55
(requiring state courts to register aliens and issue certificates of registry); Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29,
§ 3, 1 Stat. 132 (requiring state courts to resolve disputes involving questions of ship seaworthiness);
Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 3, I Stat. 302-05 (requiring state courts to hear claims of slave owners
seeking extradition of apprehended fugitive slaves).
88. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370 (citing Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509 (1910)) (holding
that the naturalization acts conferred authority upon state courts) and United States v. Jones, 109 U.S.
513 (1883) (holding that the naturalization acts' obligations were imposed with the consent of the
states).
89. Id. at 2371 (referring to Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)). The Supremacy Clause reads:
"the Laws of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby." U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
90. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2371 (referring to Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987)); see
also Extradition Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 1, I Stat. 302 (requiring state executive officers to deliver
fugitives from justice within that state's jurisdiction to the state from which the fugitive fled).
91. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2371.
92. Id. at 2372.
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employ the magistery of the states in the execution of national law. 93
However, the critical point for the Court was that these statements did not
necessarily imply that Congress could make those impositions without
the consent of the states. 94
In his dissent, Justice Souter relied heavily on The Federalist No. 27,
prompting the Court to examine that document in detail. 95 In that docu-
ment, Alexander Hamilton states: "all officers, legislative, executive, and
judicial in each state will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus, the
legislature, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members will be
incorporated into the operations of the national government ... ; and will
be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws."
96
The Court rejected this passage as supporting a federal command
over state executives in several ways. 97 First, the consequences "incor-
porated into" and "rendered auxiliary to" flowed automatically from
the necessary oath by states to observe the supreme law of the land.
98
Therefore, if the passage was meant to require state officers to implement
federal law, as Justice Souter suggested, then the officers would have to
apply the law without any requirement for a congressional directive to
do so.99 According to the Court, no one had ever suggested that that was
the law. 100
Second, sole reliance on the natural reading of the passage would
make state legislatures subject to federal direction as well. 101 However,
the Court had consistently held that state legislatures were not subject to
federal control. 102 In response, the Court offered its own interpretation
that the passage simply meant that state officials have a duty not to enact
laws obstructing the operations of the federal government.103
Finally, the Court refused to acknowledge congressionally funded
mandates, or mandates which only require states to perform ministerial
reporting functions, as in the case at hand. 104 Congressionally funded
mandates are nothing more than preconditions for states to receive
federal funding within a specified regulatory scheme.' 05 Additionally,
93. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 27, 36 (Alexander Hamilton)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2373.
96. Id.; see THE FEDERALIST No. 27 (Alexander Hamilton).
97. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2373-75.
98. Id. at 2373.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (emphasis added). The Court pointed out that legislatures are explicitly referred to in the
passage. Id.
102. Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)).
103. Id. at 2374.
104. Id. at 2376.
105. Id.
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ministerial reporting requirements are different from the Brady Act, in
that they do not force state executives to administer a federal regulatory
plan.106 Thus, the Court concluded that historical constitutional practice
did not support the existence of a congressional power to compel state
executives into action. 107
B. STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION
The Court's inquiry into the structure of the Constitution was
necessary in order to determine if the congressional power asserted by
the government was among the Constitution's essential postulates.l08
The Court reaffirmed the fact that the Constitution established a system
of dual sovereignty.109 This assertion was set forth implicitly through
the enumerated powers and explicitly through the Tenth Amendment. 1'0
Moreover, the Court observed that the experience of the Framers
under the Articles of the Confederation led them to choose a constitution
under which individuals, rather than states, are the only proper focus of
government."'t The Court acknowledged that a federal-state separation
of powers is necessary to prevent a central government from controlling
the states. 112 Therefore, the Court held that the powers of the federal
government would be strengthened immeasurably if the government
were able to press the executive officers of a state into service.113
The Court went on to determine that the Brady Bill implicated a
federal separation of powers conflict as well. 114 Through Article II, sec-
tion 3, the President ensures that the law is faithfully executed. 115 The
Court determined that the Brady Act transferred that responsibility to the
CLEOs of the states, and thereby impermissibly shattered the unity of the
federal executive. 116 The Court then proceeded to attack the dissent's
reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause. 117 To the Court, when a
law violates the constitutional principle of state sovereignty, it cannot be
106. Id. The Court's refusal to consider ministerial mandates in this case was not a constitutional
endorsement of those mandates. Id. Rather, the Court simply reserved that question for a case
challenging those mandates directly and properly. Id.
107. Id. at 2376.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. Justice Scalia reasoned that because the Constitution refrained from giving Congress a
plenary power, that fact implied a residual state sovereignty. Id.
11 . Id. at 2377.
112. Id. at 2378.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art II, § 3.
116. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378.
117. Id. at 2379.
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a law necessary to the execution of an enumerated power."l 8 As a result,
the Brady Act was held to be inconsistent with both the structure of the
Constitution and historical constitutional practice.119
C. PRIOR JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT
Prior decisions of the Court also indicated that the federal govern-
ment could not compel the states, through either its legislative or
executive branches, to administer federal regulatory programs. 120 In par-
ticular, the Court definitively held in New York that the federal govern-
ment "may not compel the states to enact or administer a federal regula-
tory program."121 However, the government argued that the provisions
at issue in the Brady Act were distinguishable from New York because the
Act neither required state officials to make policy, nor diminished fed-
eral accountability.1 22 The Court dismissed both arguments, reasoning
that executive action without any policy-making component was rare,
and that it was the state official who would get the blame for any
erroneous determinations concerning handgun purchases.123
Finally, the government asserted that the Brady Act's important
objectives would be most efficiently administered by local CLEOs, and
that public policy demanded such a minimal and temporary burden on
the state. 124 The Court agreed that if the Brady Act was a law of general
applicability with incidental effects on state functions, such a balancing
act would be appropriate. 125 In contrast, the Court concluded that in this
case, the very object of the Brady Act was to direct state executives, a
defect which no comparison of interests could overcome. 126
Consequently, the Court struck down the background check provi-
sion and the implied duty that the CLEO accept the Brady Form from
the gun dealer, as a violation of the Tenth Amendment.127 The two
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2378.
120. Id. at 2380. The Court cited Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264 (1981) and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). In Hodel, the Court clearly stated that
Congress could not impair a state's ability to function within the federal system. 452 U.S. at 287-88.
In both cases, the Court upheld the regulations because Congress could have regulated the individual
parties directly. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 764-65; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288. Thus, the regulations were
merely requirements for continued state regulation in an otherwise preempted field. FERC, 456 U.S.
at 764-65.
121. Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2380 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 142, 188 (1992)).
122. Id. at 2380, 2382.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2383.
125. Id.; see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 468 U.S. 528 (1985). The challenged
law in Garcia was said to be generally applicable because it applied equally to the state and to private
party employers. See id. at 533.
126. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383.
127. Id. at 2383-84.
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remaining challenged provisions became voluntary. 128 Therefore, the
Court held that Congress cannot issue directives requiring states to
address particular problems, nor can it command the states' officers or
their political subdivisions to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program. 129
1. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor fully joined the majority opinion with respect to
the offending provisions of the Brady Act.130  However, Justice
O'Connor specified that Congress was free to amend the Act in such a
way as to condition the receipt of federal funds upon its enforcement. 131
Further, Justice O'Connor reaffirmed the majority's position that the
disposition of this case was inappropriate for congressional actions
requiring only ministerial reporting requirements, such as requiring
states to report missing children.' 32
2. Justice Thomas' Concurrence
Justice Thomas also joined fully the majority opinion with respect
to the background check provision. 133 However, Justice Thomas con-
tinued his "revisionist" view of the commerce power first expressed in
his concurrence to United States v. Lopez. 134 Justice Thomas again re-
fused to accept the notion that purely intrastate point-of-sale transactions
are subject to the commerce power. 135 Thus, in this case, Justice Thomas
argued that Congress surely could not compel state law enforcement
officers to do what Congress could not do directly.1
36
128. Id. at 2384. The Court determined that the provisions of the Brady Act not affecting the
CLEOs were severable from the rest of the Act, and declined to adjudicate the rights of parties not
before the Court. Id.
129. Id. at 2384.
130. Id. at 2385.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a)) (1994) (requiring state and local authorities to report cases
of missing children); see also id. at 2376 (refusing to consider the constitutionality of several statutes
requiring state officers to perform reporting functions). However, Justice O'Connor did not indicate
why the disposition of Printz was inappropriate for such ministerial functions. Id. at 2385; see infra pp.
70-73.
133. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385.
134. Id.; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(urging the Court to reconsider the "substantial effects" doctrine for validating congressional actions
under the commerce power).
135. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385.
136. Id. Justice Thomas also alluded to the idea that the Second Amendment might be implicated
by the Brady Act as well. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. II (conferring the right of the people to
keep and bear arms). Justice Thomas acknowledged that the Court has not had an occasion to decide
if the Second Amendment confers a substantive right to keep and bear arms. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2386.
However, if such a right exists, it would possibly provide affirmative limitations on the regulation of
firearms sales under the commerce power. Id.
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3. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens asserted that the text of the Constitution plainly
confers upon Congress the power to impose affirmative obligations on
the executive officers of the states. 137 Moreover, the Tenth Amendment,
unlike the First Amendment, does not provide a restriction upon Con-
gress in the exercise of its enumerated powers. 138 Thus, Justice Stevens
concluded that there was no clause, sentence, or paragraph in the Consti-
tution disallowing Congress the power to commandeer local law enforce-
ment officers in the exercise of its enumerated powers.139 Justice Stevens
then proceeded to address the historical, structural, and jurisprudential
foundations of the majority opinion.1
40
a. Historical Foundation
Justice Stevens' principle difference with the majority in terms of
the historical record was his interpretation of the motivations of the Fram-
ers in evolving governments. 14 1 Justice Stevens believed that the changes
in government brought about by the Constitution were implemented to
increase national power under The Articles to cover individuals, as well as
the states, rather than to address concerns of state sovereignty.1 42 Justice
Stevens also categorically disagreed with the majority's rationale in
examining the statutory enactments of the earliest congresses.143 Point-
ing out that the naturalization statutes were clearly set out in mandatory
terms, and that early legislation required courts to act as regulatory
agencies, Justice Stevens argued that this was further "weighty and con-
temporaneous evidence" of the earliest understanding that the Consti-
137. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. Id. Justice Stevens pointed out that the Commerce Clause granted Congress the power to
regulate commerce among the states. Id. at 2387 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). In addition,
Congress' authority was expanded by the Constitution to make all laws "necessary and proper" for its
execution. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
138. Id. at 2387 (citing the U.S. CONST. amend. X).
139. Id. at 2389.
140. Id. at 2389, 2394, 2397.
141. See id. at 2389.
142. Id. Justice Stevens' primary authority for his interpretation were the writings of Alexander
Hamilton. Id. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 15, 27 (Alexander Hamilton). Most notable were Hamilton's
statements that the Constitution would "enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of
each [state]," and that state legislatures, courts, and magistrates would be "incorporated into the
national government" and "rendered auxiliary to" the enforcement of its laws. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at
2389-90 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 27 (Alexander Hamilton)). For Justice Stevens, Hamilton clearly
meant to grant the Federal Government the power to demand that local officials implement national
programs. Id.
143. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2391.
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tution did confer upon Congress the power rejected by the majority.144
Therefore, Justice Stevens believed that the unambiguous language of
Alexander Hamilton, combined with the practices of the earliest con-
gresses, discounted the existence of limitations on the commerce power
announced by the majority.145
b. Constitutional Foundation
Justice Stevens also insisted that an acknowledgment that the Fram-
ers intended to preserve state sovereignty said nothing about the issue of
whether Congress can direct state executives. 146 According to Justice
Stevens, the means by which the Framers ensured the role of the states in
the federal system were the procedural structures of a popularly elected
federal government. 147 Perhaps even more significant was the apparent
conflict of the majority's decision with previous Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence.148 As Justice Stevens pointed out, the Court had "con-
sistently refused to construe the [Eleventh] Amendment to afford protec-
tion to political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities."1 49
Consequently, Justice Stevens could not reconcile the majority's exten-
sion of Tenth Amendment protection to local law enforcement officers,
even in the event that the Amendment did insulate state officers.150
Justice Stevens also rejected the majority's contention that the
Brady Act would diminish federal accountability and destroy the unity
of the federal executive. 151 Justice Stevens accused the majority of rely-
ing on speculation with respect to accountability, and characterized any
infringement on the federal executive power as simply cooperative feder-
alism.152 Justice Stevens viewed the majority rule as a threat to, rather
144. Id. at 2391-92 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986)). For Justice
Stevens, terms within the naturalization statutes, such as "shall record," "shall administer," and "shall
be the duty" were indicative of mandatory requirements. Id.
145. See id. at 2393-94.
146. ld. at 2394.
147. Id. (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985)). In
making that assertion, Justice Stevens observed that the members of Congress are popularly elected by
the people, and that each state is guaranteed equal representation at the federal level through the Sen-
ate. Id. Justice Stevens determined that it was unlikely that these elected officials would ignore the
sovereignty concerns of their constituents when passing legislation. Id.
148. Id. at 2394 n.16.
149. Id. The I Ith Amendment provides that "the Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States, by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend Xl.
150. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2394.
151. Id. at 2395-96.
152. Id. According to Justice Stevens, the majority was in direct conflict with the recognition in
New York v. United States that programs can be designed at the federal level, yet implemented at the
local level. Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).
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than a protection of, state sovereignty by creating incentives for the fed-
eral government to aggrandize itself by directly implementing its policy
through a vast federal bureaucracy.1 53
c. Jurisprudential Foundation
Justice Stevens had to look no further than New York v. United
States for his inquiry into the prior jurisprudence of the Court.154 Jus-
tice Stevens argued that giving a state "no option other than that of
implementing legislation enacted by Congress," as in New York, was
certainly different than the minimal requirements placed on CLEOs by
the Brady Act. 155
Justice Stevens also identified three additional cases which featured
far more burdensome congressional mandates on the states than the
Brady Act, but were nonetheless upheld. 156 First, the challenged act in
FERC v. Mississippi was upheld despite offering the state no "real"
choice in terms of adopting federal regulations.1 57 Second, in Puerto
Rico v. Branstad, the Court found no constitutional hurdles for imposing
the Extradition Act's requirements on state executive officers. 158 Third,
Justice Stevens claimed that the majority improperly dismissed the
significance of Testa v. Katt.159
Justice Stevens considered the burdens placed upon state sovereign-
ty by federal regulations in Testa to be much greater than the majority's
characterization of Testa's holding that the Supremacy Clause only dic-
tates that "state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law."1 60 Accord-
ing to Justice Stevens, the Supremacy Clause confers a duty on state
courts to apply federal law in cases that they decide to entertain, but does
not empower Congress to command those courts to accept jurisdiction of
federal claims, as Testa allowed.161 Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that
rather than announcing a newly defined constitutional threshold, the
Court should respect the judgment of Congress and realize the
effectiveness of cooperative federalism, as opposed to an enlarged
federal bureaucracy. 162
153. Id. at 2396.
154. Id. at 2397.
155. Id. at 2398.
156. Id. at 2399-400.
157. Id. at 2399 (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-66 (1982)).
158. Id. (citing Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 228-29 (1987)).
159. Id. at 2400 (citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)).
160. Id. (citing Testa, 330 U.S. at 394).
161. Id. (citing Testa, 330 U.S. at 394).
162. Id. at 2401.
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4. Justice Souter's Dissent
Justice Souter found that only The Federalist provided a truly force-
ful argument in favor of the government's position. 163 Specifically,
Justice Souter relied on The Federalist No. 27, in which Alexander
Hamilton addressed the combined effect of the Supremacy Clause and
the oath requirement.164 According to Justice Souter, the natural reading
of Hamilton's words, "incorporated into" and "auxiliary to," created
obligations on the states to support federal law.165
In addition, Justice Souter distinguished his reading of The Federal-
ist No. 27 from New York by differentiating executive power from legis-
lative power.166 An executive's power is to enforce the law, and as such,
is an auxiliary which could be under the command of a sovereign.167 A
legislator, however, makes discretionary decisions on what the law
should be. Therefore, any coercion of legislative discretion necessarily
damaged the legislator itself.168
Justice Souter found support for his interpretation of Alexander
Hamilton from James Madison in The Federalist No. 44.169 In that pas-
sage, Madison stated that officers of state governments will have an
"essential agency" in giving effect to the Constitution. 170 In The Feder-
alist No. 45, Madison identified an essential agency as the collection of
federal taxes by state officers.171 In The Federalist No. 36, Madison
stated that the Federal government would employ state officers as much
as possible.' 72 Justice Souter believed that these statements, taken to-
gether with his reading of Hamilton, could only mean that the Framers
intended for the national government to have the power to require state
auxiliaries to take action in response to a legal exercise of power. 173
However, Justice Souter acknowledged that Congress could not require
state administrative support without an obligation to pay for it, thus the
case should have been remanded in order to develop a budget provision
for the Brady Act. 174
163. Id. at 2402.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2402 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 27 (Alexander Hamilton)).
166. Id. at 2402 n. 1.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2403.
170. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 44 at 307 (James Madison)).
171. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 45 at 313 (James Madison)) (stating that the collection of
federal taxes would generally be made under the rule, and by the officers of the state).
172. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 36 at 228 (James Madison)).




5. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer sought to add to Justice Stevens' dissent empirical
evidence of the experiences of other democratic nations in preserving
the autonomy of constituent entities.175 Justice Breyer noted that the
federal systems of Germany, Switzerland, and the European Union all
use their constituent bodies to implement laws of the central body. 176
According to Justice Breyer, they do this in order to increase the free-
doms recognized through a reduced central bureaucracy. 177 These ex-
periences of our European counterparts led Justice Breyer to conclude
that there was no need in this case to set forth a principle forbidding the
assignment of any federal duty upon a state official. 178
IV. IMPACT
The Printz decision struck a quick blow to the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA) in Condon v. Reno. 179 The Act was a
congressional response to criminal activities carried out, at least in part,
through information obtained in state motor vehicle records.1 80 The
DPPA prohibits a state department of motor vehicles, or any agent there-
of, from knowingly disclosing to any person or entity, personal infor-
mation obtained by the department through a motor vehicle record.181
The DPPA also authorized the motor vehicle departments to estab-
lish the procedures for informing individuals that their information has
been requested.182 These procedures required a statement that the infor-
mation would not be released unless the individual consented. 183 In addi-
tion, any state found to be in "substantial noncompliance" can be fined
up to $5,000 per day. 184 The Federal District Court for the District of




178. Id. at 2405.
179. 972 F. Supp. 977, 979 (D.S.C. 1997)
180. Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 979 (D.S.C. 1997) (noting congressional findings that
criminals use information contained in motor vehicle records to locate potential victims in furtherance
of criminal activities).
181. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (West Supp. 1998).
182. Id. § 272 1(d). The statute identified several exceptions involving persons or entities, usually
governmental bodies in official actions, who are allowed to receive the proscribed information. Id. §
2721(b).
183. Id. § 2721(d).
184. Id. § 2723(b).
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on state sovereignty, and granted an injunction permanently enjoining its
application in South Carolina.185
The court found that motor vehicle records are the property of the
states, and that the states have historically maintained such records in
their sovereign capacities.186 The Court concluded that in enacting the
DPPA Congress decided to require the states to regulate the dissemi-
nation of motor vehicle records, thereby commanding the states to
implement a federal policy.187
The court rejected the argument promulgated by the United States,
that since the DPPA did not.compel the state to control the activities of
its citizens, the Act did not offend New York or Printz.188 First, the court
noted that the take-title provision struck down in New York did not
require the state to regulate the conduct of its citizens. 189 In fact, under
the take-title provision the state was free to refrain from addressing the
radioactive waste problem at all if the state was willing to take title to that
waste.190 According to the Court, the point of contention in New York
was that the state was required to take-title to the waste, rather than a
requirement that the state regulate the conduct of its citizens.191
Second, assuming that New York and Printz could be read so
prohibitively as to preclude only congressional acts which require a state
to control the conduct of its citizens, the Act would still fail because it
requires that the state control the conduct of two classes of citizens.
Those classes include individuals employed with the state's motor
vehicle department and private citizens wishing access to the depart-
ment's information. 192 Therefore, the court concluded that the Act was
an impermissible congressional command under New York since the Act
required the state to perform a regulatory function.1 93
The court also determined that the United States' reliance on
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth. as controlling was similarly
misplaced.194 In contrast to the Act in Garcia, the DPPA is not an inci-
dental application of a federal law of general applicability imposed on
the states. 195 Rather, the DPPA was passed specifically to regulate the
185. Condon, 972 F. Supp. at 979, 986.
186. Id. at 984.
187. Id. at 984-85.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 985.
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
195. Id. (citing Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383 (1997)).
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control of state property, and to require the state to control the access
and use of its information.196
The Printz decision and its subsequent application in Condon begs
the question of how Congress will be able to implement its programs to
the states in the future. 197 Under the current law, Congress may encour-
age and influence state policy-making in two ways.198 First, Congress
may attach regulatory conditions to the receipt of federal funding by the
states.199 However, the conditions must relate to federal spending. 200
Such a system is constitutional because it allows a state the "choice" of
accepting federal funding and regulating according to federal prescrip-
tions, or of declining the funding and regulating according to the state's
own will.2 0
1
A second way by which Congress may influence state policy-
making is through "cooperative federalism." 202 Under "cooperative
federalism" two things must happen. 203 Congress must first have the
power to regulate the targeted activity through a valid exercise of
an enumerated power. 204 Thereafter, Congress may offer states the
"choice" of regulating according to federal standards, or the federal
regulation will pre-empt the state law. 205 Thus, if state residents choose
to allocate state resources to areas other than those subject to pre-
emption, the federal government, and not the state, must bear the
expense of the regulatory scheme. 206 Consequently, the Printz decision,
by expanding the above doctrines to include state executive officials as
well as state legislatures, defines the Tenth Amendment as an express
limitation on Congress' authority to require the states to act in virtually
any capacity, congressional funding notwithstanding. 207
Perhaps the Printz decision foreshadows the eventual challenge to
all recent congressional enactments which require a state to perform a
reporting function. 208 While the Court specifically declined to consider
196. Id. at 985-86.
197. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383-84 (1997); Condon, 972 F. Supp. at 986.
198. New York v. United States, 505 US. 144, 166 (1992).
199. Id. at 167 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)).
200. Id. (citing South Dakota, 483 U.S. at 207-08).
201. Id. at 168.





206. Id. at 168.
207. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383-84 (1997) (emphasis added).
208. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2645(e) (1994) (requiring governors to report certain activities of
local educational agencies); 20 U.S.C. § 4013(a) (1994) (requiring governors to submit plans for
asbestos removal); 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1994) (requiring state officials to report traffic fatalities); 42
U.S.C. § 5779(a) (1994) (requiring state law enforcement to report missing children); 42 U.S.C. §
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the validity of any statutes not challenged in this case, Justice O'Con-
nor's language in her concurrence hinted that requiring states to
perform only ministerial tasks might not infringe on state sovereignty. 209
Assuming that was in fact Justice O'Connor's intent, then federal man-
dates requiring no more than "ministerial functions" from state officials
would probably withstand constitutional challenge at the present time.2 10
Whether Justice O'Connor meant to establish a new constitutional
"ministerial" boundary for federal regulatory actions will perhaps be
answered when the challenge arises. 211
Moreover, the Printz decision underscores the uncertainty surround-
ing Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. 2 12 Such a conclusion precipitates
from two sources. 213 Principally, this assertion flows expressly from the
strong dissent of four Justices. 214 In addition, by not overruling Garcia
and its procedural, paradigm for protecting state sovereignty, the Court
has left in place precedential authority, fully adopted by the dissent,
which is potentially counter to the Printz holding.2 15 While the recent
trend of Supreme Court interpretations of federalism seem to focus on
the states' role in that system, the division of the Court makes it impos-
sible to predict the future of cases like Printz. It seems as though the
outcome may likely be determined by the political philosophies of fu-
ture Supreme Court appointees, rather than upon a strong constitutional
foundation. 216
Finally, in finding the Brady Act provisions not affecting CLEOs
severable from the rest of the Act, the Court leaves the fate of gun
dealers and gun purchasers unanswered. 2 17 The remaining question is
whether gun dealers and purchasers are still required to submit a copy of
the Brady Form to the CLEO, even if the CLEO refuses to accept them,
and then wait five days before consummating the transaction. 218 The
6933(a) (1994) (requiring state inventories of hazardous waste); 42 U.S.C. § 11001, 11003 (1994)
(requiring collection and reporting of data of the release of hazardous waste); see also Brief for
Respondent at 31; Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503) (stating that
accepting Printz's argument would invalidate several recent congressional enactments).
209. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385. Justice O'Connor referred to the statutes not before the Court
as "purely ministerial," in contrast to the invalid portions of the Brady Act which "directly compel"
state administration. Id.
210. See id. at 2385-86. This assertion assumes that the interpretation of Justice O'Connor's
intent is correct and that at least the four dissenters in Printz would join that opinion. Id. at 2386.
211. Id. at 2376 (stating that the most recent congressional mandates to the states would only be
considered when the proper case is brought before the Court).
212. Id. at 2386 (Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissenting).
213. Id. (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985)).
214. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2386.
215. Id. at 2383; see also Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552 (holding that state sovereignty should be pro-
tected procedurally through the 10th Amendment, rather than judicially).
216. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2404-05 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the political philosophies
of other democratic nations in order to contradict the majority's holding).




immediate answer is probably, yes. 219 The most apparent support for
this assertion rests in the fact that those provisions are still the law, and
Justice Scalia made it clear that those provisions would remain the law
until challenged by a proper party, namely, a gun dealer. 220 Therefore,
the requirements of the Brady Form and the waiting period are probably
firmly in place until the interim period expires. 221
V. CONCLUSION
In Printz, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the federal
government may not compel states as states to implement federal policy,
through the states' executive or legislative branches. However, the Court
did not include in its holding the fate of federal legislation requiring
states to act in only a "ministerial" capacity. Therefore, what remains is
whether the Court will use the Printz holding in future challenges to
federal legislation as establishing a threshold of interference with state
functions which are beyond the reach of the federal government, or
whether Printz stands as a wholesale prohibition on the federal govern-
ment's ability to require the states to act in any capacity whatsoever.
Christopher D. Owens
219. Id. (noting that Justice Scalia stated that the Court had no business deciding the rights of
parties not presently before it).
220. Id. However, perhaps more importantly a future challenge by a gun dealer would probably
not be successful. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
276 (1981). This result is probable because once an activity is found to substantially affect interstate
commerce, a court must then only determine that the regulation is rationally related to the end sought
in controlling the targeted activity. Id. The argument that a gun dealer would thus have to make
would be that handgun violence does not substantially affect interstate commerce, or that the
remaining provisions of the Brady Act have no rational relationship toward curbing handgun violence.
Compare United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School Zones
Act because possession of a firearm is not an economic activity affecting commerce) with Hodel, 452
U.S. at 276 (holding that the means chosen [to regulate] by Congress must only be rationally related to
the end sought). Neither argument would likely prevail. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508
U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (giving great judicial deference to congressional decisions relating to regulatory
means and ends); H.R. REP. No. 103-344, at 8, reprinted in, 1993 U.S.C.A.A.N. 1984, 1985 (finding
that the United States is beset with an epidemic of handgun violence).
221. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383 (noting that CLEOs can voluntarily implement the federal
program).
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